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Abstract
This study revisits the relationship between competition and innovation by in-
corporating an endogenous market structure (EMS) in a dynamic general equilib-
rium model. We consider that both innovative and non-innovative followers engage
in Cournot competition with free entry. A competition-enhancing policy, which re-
duces entry cost, can stimulate the entry of innovative followers when the entry cost
is high. However, when the entry cost is sufficiently low, the entry of non-innovative
followers crowd-out innovative followers from the market. As a result, there is a
non-monotonic relationship (inverted-V shape) between competition and innovation.
Furthermore, we show that, while strengthening patent protection positively affects
innovation when competition is sufficiently intense, the effect may be negative un-
der milder competition. This suggests that a competition policy could complement a
patent policy.
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1 Introduction
Over the years, many researchers have attempted to explore how intensifying product
market competition (PMC) affects innovation. Schumpeter (1950) considers monopolis-
tic profit as the most powerful engine driving technological progress. In pure Schum-
peterian growth models, competition mostly discourages firms from innovation because
post-innovation profit shrinks under harsh PMC (also known as the “Schumpeterian ef-
fect”).
However, the results of empirical analyses are mixed and do not necessarily show
such clear trade-off between competition and innovation. Aghion et al. (2005), the most
influential study in the field, show an inverted-U relationship between competition and
innovation using data for the United Kingdom. They also extend a Schumpeterian growth
model and demonstrate non-monotonicity between the two. Hashmi (2013) demonstrates
a negative relationship between PMC and innovation in the United States and that the
relationship may differ across countries. On the other hand, using the same data, Corera
and Ornaghi (2014) indicate that PMC positively impacts innovation when control vari-
ables are changed. More recently, Blazsek and Escribano (2016) also suggest that PMC
enhances innovation in the United States. In sum, the relationship between PMC and
innovation remains controversial.1
Many theoretical studies have examined the relationship between PMC and innova-
tion assuming a fixed number of incumbents in the product market. Using an oligopolistic
model, Aghion et al. (1997, 2001, 2005) show that strong PMC may enhance economic
growth since it stimulates the neck-and-neck firms’ incentive to innovate (“escape compe-
tition effect”) and this outweighs the Schumpeterian effect. However, needless to say, the
interrelationship between the number of firms and status of PMC is intrinsic to investigate
the competition–innovation relationship more precisely. In fact, Etro (2007) point out that
the escape competition effect completely disappears under the assumption of free entry.
In this case, the non-monotonicity between PMC and innovation also vanishes. Hence, it
is necessary to consider this issue in a more general framework, which is an endogenous
market structure (EMS), where the number of firms in the product market is endogenously
determined.2
Using an EMS model, some studies have recently analyzed the relationship between
PMC and innovation. Denicolo and Zanchettin (2010) extend a quality-ladder growth
model in which the total number of asymmetric incumbents is endogenously determined.
In their model, several efficient incumbents can remain in the market, even if further
innovation occurs, since their model assumes that patent length is infinite and firms do
1For a comprehensive survey of empirical studies, see Cohen (2010).
2See Etro (2007, 2009) for EMS models.
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not engage in Bertrand competition. Then, strong PMC excludes inefficient incumbents
from the market and increases the market share of an efficient incumbent. They also
demonstrate that intense PMC may stimulate the incentive to innovate through this mar-
ket selection process. Bento (2014) incorporates the uncertainty of quality-improvement
size in a Schumpeterian growth model, wherein the incumbent’s markup is endogenously
determined. In his model, a fortunate potential firm that draws the best quality among all
firm becomes the monopolist. When an innovator’s market entry cost is low, the number
of firms that draws the lottery increases. The increase in the number of firms decreases
the probability that one firm wins (this discourages each firm’s research by the Schum-
peterian effect), but increases the winner’s quality level and innovation value (he labels
this as the “Hayekian effect”). He further shows that these opposite effects generate an
inverted-U relationship between PMC and research per firm.
This study investigates the relationship between PMC and innovation by developing
a dynamic equilibrium (DGE) model with EMS. Unlike other studies that consider R&D
activities by potential firms as the key driver of growth, we consider a situation in which
only active firms in the product markets engage in R&D as in Aghion et al. (2005). This is
inspired by some empirical findings that existing firms’ quality improvement, rather than
creative destruction by the entrant, is a major source of growth.3 In the model, firms can
enter the product market as innovative or non-innovative followers without infringing the
leader’s patent and engage in Cournot competition with the leader. Innovative followers
also conduct R&D activities and the successful researcher becomes the new leader in
the market. A competition-enhancing policy, which reduces entry cost, stimulates the
entry of innovative followers when the level of PMC is low. However, when PMC is
sufficiently tough, the policy hinders innovation since non-innovative followers crowd-
out innovative followers from the market. As a result, a competition-enhancing policy has
a non-monotonic effect on innovation. Furthermore, our model shows that strengthening
patent protection does not always enhance innovation. We find that the pro-patent policy
always has a positive effect on innovation when PMC is sufficiently intense. This result
suggests a complementarity between a competition policy and patent policy, which is
consistent with the empirical findings in Aghion et al. (2015).
It is also worthwhile to note the differences between the present study and existing
literature. As Etro (2007) argue, our model does not have an escape competition ef-
fect in Aghion et al. (2005) because of free entry. Nonetheless, we can demonstrate a
non-monotonic relationship between competition and growth using another mechanism
mentioned previously. Bento (2014) also obtain an inverted-U relationship between PMC
3See Bartelsman and Doms (2000) and Garcia-Macia et al. (2016). In particular, Garcia-Macia et al.
(2016) report that 87.2% of TFP growth for 2003-2013 in the United States can be attributed to existing
firms’ innovation.
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and innovation in a partial equilibrium framework that keeps both the interest rate and
economic growth rate constant. However, he does not explicitly examine this using a
general equilibrium model owing to the complexity.4 Our DGE model has an advantage
in the point. Furthermore, the model in Bento (2014) consists of a monopolist in each
intermediate goods market because of Bertrand competition and potential firms conduct
all research. In contrast, our Cournot competition model under free entry in the product
market allows imitators to enter and a part of these producing firms engage in R&D ac-
tivities. As a parameter for PMC level, Aghion et al. (2005) use an exogenous degree
of collusion in neck-and-neck industries in which duopolistic firms have the same level
of technology. However, such a proxy for PMC not only lacks a micro-foundation but
also captures a somewhat industry-specific competition policy because it has no impact
on PMC in industries comprising firms with differing technology levels. Denicolo and
Zanchettin (2010) use a parameter of conjectural variations as a measure of competition
level, which has been criticized by many theorists. Unlike these studies, we use entry cost
as a parameter for PMC degree, which allows us to easily highlight the policy implica-
tions.5
This study also revisits the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPR) and
innovation, for which many related works have been published.6 In particular, Chu et al.
(2016) study the effect of strengthening patent protection on economic growth in a model
with EMS. They develop a hybrid model of variety expansion and quality improvement,
where the introduction of a new variety is considered as a market entry and the number
of firms (varieties) is endogenously determined. Their model shows that strict patent pro-
tection enhances growth in the short run but hinders it in the long run because it expands
the number of entrants and decreases the market share per firm.7 By contrast, we find that
strong patent protection may have a positive effect even in the long run. Furthermore, our
study considers a competition-patent policy mix by examining the comparative statics of
4Also, in the context of industrial organization, many studies have dealt with the relationship between
competition and innovation using partial equilibrium models. For example, Boone (2001) shows a non-
monotonic relationship between competition intensity and R&D incentive.
5In addition to these recent studies, Van de Klundert and Smulders (1997) investigate the effect of
competition on economic growth using an endogenous growth model with EMS. They use the distinction
between Cournot and Bertrand competition to denote competition intensity and show that tougher PMC
always yields a higher innovation rate.
6See, for example, Cysne and Turchick (2012), Furukawa (2007), Futagami and Iwaisako (2007), Horii
and Iwaisako (2007), and Suzuki (2015). In particular, Suzuki (2015) extends a quality-ladder model in
which the monopolist’s markup size is endogenously determined, as in this study, by his optimal choice
of several IPR protections (patent and trade secret). His model shows that, depending on the risk of trade
secret leakage, the effect of strengthening patent protection on economic growth can be negative, U-shaped,
or positive.
7This trade-off between the number of firms (varieties of differentiated goods) and innovation is a com-
mon feature in models where the introduction of a new variety is considered as a market entry. See also Van
de Klundert and Smulders (1997), Peretto (1999), and Minniti (2009).
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patent protection under several PMC levels.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
Section 3 solves the equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the effects of competition-enhancing
and patent policies on innovation and welfare. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
This section develops a DGE model with EMS. The model is based on quality-ladder type
endogenous growth model in Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch.4).
2.1 Households
We consider an economy consisting of L identical and infinitely lived households. Each
household supplies a unit of labor inelastically and earns wage w in every period. Their
intertemporal utility function is as follows:
Ut =
Z 1
0
exp( t) lnCtdt; (1)
where  is the subjective discount rate and Ct is an index of consumption at time t. In
the economy, there is a continuum of industries indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. The households
consume final goods across all industries. The period utility is,
lnCt =
Z 1
0
ln
0@ ~k(i)X
k=0
kXkt(i)
1A di; (2)
where Xkt(i) is the consumption of the good whose quality is k in industry i at time t.
The quality of each good is represented as an integer k power of  > 1, which means that
the quality of the new good is  times higher than that of the previous one. In industry i,
there are ~k(i) types of goods and the quality of the latest good is ~k(i). We can show that,
in equilibrium, households buy only the highest quality good in each industry.
Under the logarithmic utility function, households spend their budget equally across
the industries. Therefore, the demand of a good in the industry i is X~k(i) = E=p~k(i),
where E is expenditure and p~k is the price of the good whose quality is ~k(i).
In this setting, the ideal price index associated with the consumption index C is
P = exp
Z 1
0
ln

p~k(i)
~k(i)

di: (3)
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Given the aggregate price index, households spend to maximize their intertemporal utility.
From the maximization result, household’s optimal time path for spending is represented
by _E=E = r . Using aggregate expenditure as the numeraire, we get E = 1 and r = .
Hereinafter, we omit i from the notations if there is no risk of misunderstanding.
2.2 Industries
Consider an industry that consists of a leader and N followers. All of them engage in
Cournot competition, where their unit production costs are asymmetric. While the leader
can produce a good using one unit of labor, followers must devote  > 1 units of labor
to produce a unit of the same good. We assume that patent protection is imperfect and
followers can partially imitate the leader’s good without infringing the patent. Parameter
 2 (1=; 1) indicates the degree of patent breadth.8 As we derived, the inverse demand
function for goods in an industry is p = 1=X . In the market equilibrium, X equals the
aggregate output in the industry. Given the inverse demand function and wage rate of
one unit of labor, w, producer j maximizes her own profit, (j). Accordingly, the profit
maximization problem is
max
x(j)
(j) =
1
X
 x(j)  c(j)  w  x(j); (4)
where x(j) is output level and c(j) is production cost.9 By solving this, we obtain the
output of producer j as follows:
@(j)
@x(j)
= 0 , 1
X
  x(j)
X2
  c(j)  w = 0
, x(j) = X   c(j)  w X2: (5)
We denote xL and xF as the output of the leader and followers in the industry. Assume
that all followers are symmetric. Then, the aggregate output in the industry is written as
X = xL +N  xF . We can derive the price in the Cournot equilibrium as follows:
X = X   wX2 +N   X   wX2
, p =

1 +N
N

w: (6)
8Patent breadth is the extent to which patent holders can legally prevent imitators from copying their
patented technologies. In our model, patent breadth is the broadest when  = 1 and narrowest when
 = 1=. The same specification of patent breadth was applied in Iwaisako et al. (2011).
9Note that c(j) = 1 when producer-j is the leader and c(j) =  when she is a follower.
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The aggregate output in the industry is
X =

N
1 + N

1
w
: (7)
It is well-known that the ratio between xL and xF is equal to that of the markup under
Cournot competition. Then, we have
xL
xF
=
p  w
p  w = 1 + (  1)N
, xL = [1 + (  1)N ]xF (i): (8)
Using this, we obtain the equilibrium output of each producer as follows:
xF =

N
(1 + N)2

1
w

; (9)
xL =

N
(1 + N)2

[1 + (  1)N ]

1
w

: (10)
Then, the follower’s and leader’s profit are
F (N) =

1
1 + N
2
; (11)
L(N) =

1  N
1 + N
2
: (12)
These functions are decreasing in N .
2.3 Followers: Imitators and Research Firms
Following Etro (2007), in this section, we incorporate the concept of EMS in the model.
There are two types of followers in the model. First is the non-innovative firms who
only imitate a state-of-the-art good. We label this type of followers as “imitators” in a
narrow sense. Second is the type of firms that not only produces an imitated good but also
conducts R&D activities. We label them as “research firms.” We assume that all R&D
activities are conducted by research firms; therefore, there is no potential researcher in the
model.10
10In most R&D-based growth models, only potential firms engage in R&D activities, while incumbents
do not because of the Arrow’s replacement effect. By contrast, in our model, R&D activities can be per-
formed for only producing firms. This assumption can be justified when the research productivity of existing
firms is lower that of potential ones because manufacturing experience gives the producer essential clues
about further innovations.
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The success of R&D activities follows a Poisson process. By employing a worker, a
research firm can draw a lottery that may succeed to create a high-quality good with a
small probability of a. In the model, there is no decision regarding the amount of R&D
investment by research firms. Therefore, the total number of research firms is equal to
that of workers employed by research firms.11 Let R denote the total number of research
firms in an industry. Then, the probability of an innovation occurring in the industry at
the interval of dt is (Ra)dt. In addition, we denote M as the total number of imitators in
the industry. In this case, N = M +R holds.
We assume that all N followers must pay a cost of e > 0 in each period.12 Since this
cost can prevent potential firms from entering the industry, in our model, we consider it
an entry cost.13 This assumption simplifies the analyses of comparative statistics. The
leader does not pay this cost because entry cost is a barrier that protects incumbent.
Then, the free-entry condition for imitators is,
F (N)  e equality holds when M > 0: (13)
Similarly, the free-entry condition for research firm is,
F (N) + aVt   w  e equality holds when R > 0; (14)
where Vt is the value of innovation. In the equilibrium, M and R are determined by these
conditions.
3 The Steady State
3.1 Equilibrium
In labor market equilibrium, aggregate labor demand X+n must be equal to labor supply
L. The labor market clearing condition is
N
1 + N

1
w

+R = L: (15)
11We can interpret research firms as non-production workers who set up their enterprise and engage in
R&D activities. Horii and Iwaisako (2007) also considered a similar R&D process specification. Note that
free-entry condition (14) also holds in this interpretation because wage is an opportunity cost.
12Alternatively, we can consider that all entrants borrow some money when they enter and constantly
repay or all followers’ projects are completed instantaneously.
13In a narrow sense, entry cost is a fixed cost that all entrants must pay when they enter the market.
However, entrants must regularly pay several other costs, which also serve as an effective entry cost in a
broad sense (e.g., advertisement and patent license fee).
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The equilibrium wage rate w is determined to satisfy this condition.
Consider the evolution of innovation value Vt. A leader earns L in every period,
unless a certain research firm successfully innovates. The leader loses her position and
must exit from the market with the probability of Ra. We assume that there is a perfectly
risk-free asset market. Therefore, the following equation holds as a no-arbitrage condition
in the asset market:
rVt = L(N) + _Vt  RaVt: (16)
3.2 The Steady State
In the equilibrium, depending on the magnitude of e > 0, there are two possible cases.
First, there is no imitator (M = 0, N = R) in the industry when e is sufficiently large.
Second, imitators and research firms coexist in the same industry (M > 0, N = M + R)
when e is sufficiently small. In the subsection, we solve the steady state for each case.
Case 1: M = 0; N = R
From the no-arbitrage condition, normalization, and profit, we obtain
_Vt = 0, Vt = [1 R=(1 + R)]
2
+Ra
: (17)
By substituting the free-entry condition for research firms (14) with the labor market
clearing condition (15), we get
Vt =
1
a
"
e+

R
(1 + R)(L R)

 

1
1 + R
2#
: (18)
These two equations reveal that the steady state is unique and unstable as in Panel (a) of
Fig.1. To guarantee the existence, we suppose an additional condition for parameters:
Assumption 1.
e <
a

+ 1  emax: (19)
Since there is only jumpable variables in the dynamics, to satisfy the transversality
condition, Vt must immediately jump to its steady-state value at t = 0. There is no
transitional dynamics in our model as in Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch.4). Therefore,
the comparative statics between different steady states are applicable.
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Case 2: M > 0; N = M +R
The free-entry condition for imitators (13) determines the total number of followers:
N =
1


1p
e
  1

 N(e): (20)
Then, by substituting equations (12) and (20) with equation (16), we have
_Vt = 0, Vt = [1  (1 
p
e)=()]
2
+Ra
: (21)
This is a decreasing function in R. Using equations (13) and (14), we obtain aVt = wt.
From this, (20), and labor market clearing condition (15), we can derive
Vt =
1
a

1 pe
(L R)

: (22)
This is an increasing function in R. Panel (b) of Fig.1 states that the steady-state in case
2 is also unique and unstable and Vt must jump to its steady-state value immediately at
t = 0. We suppose the following additional condition of parameters for the existence of a
steady state:
Assumption 2.
p
e > 1  
=a+ 1
: (23)
We define emin, the minimum non-negative value that case 2 happens, as follows:
emin = "2; (24)
where " = max

0; 1  
=a+ 1

:
Under emin < e < emax, the steady-state value of R&D workers, R, is strictly posi-
tive.14 We focus on this range of entry cost in the comparative statics.
4 Policy Effects
4.1 Competition Policy
This section investigates the impact of competition-enhancing policy on innovation, which
lowers entry cost e. In the model, the implication of a growth effect is same that of innova-
14Because 0  emin < 1 < emax always holds, the range of e is not empty.
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𝑉𝑡
𝑅
𝐿𝑅∗
eqn (18)
𝑉𝑡
𝑅
𝐿𝑅∗
eqn (22)
(𝑎) Case 1: 𝑀 = 0 (𝑏) Case 2: 𝑀 > 0
𝐸 𝐸
eqn (17) eqn (21)
Figure 1: The steady-state.
tion since the economic growth rate g  _C=C is calculated as g = Ra ln. Therefore,
we also interpret the following results as the growth effects of competition-enhancing
policy.
Case 1: M = 0; R > 0
This policy shifts curve of equation (18) downward, as in Panel (a) of Fig.2, and raises R
along the curve of equation (17). This means that the competition-enhancing policy has
a positive effect on innovation. The intuition is simple: since research firms have to pay
entry cost, a smaller entry cost allows many research firms to enter the market.
In the model, research firms have a stronger incentive to enter the market than imita-
tors who do not enter the market when F < e because research firms have an expectation
of innovation. Therefore, in case 1, the reduction of entry cost only brings in the research
firms.
Case 2: M > 0; R > 0
However, in case 2, the competition-enhancing policy has a negative effect on innovation
caused by two mechanisms.
First, the policy raises the equilibrium wage, which is the cost of R&D activities.
According equation (20), the decreasing e increases the total number of followers, N(e)
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𝑉𝑡
𝑅
𝐿𝑅∗
eqn (18)
𝑉𝑡
𝑅
𝐿𝑅∗
eqn (22)
(𝑎) Case 1: 𝑀 = 0 (𝑏) Case 2: 𝑀 > 0
𝐸 𝐸𝐸′
𝑅∗′ 𝑅∗′
𝐸′
eqn (17)
eqn (21)
Figure 2: The competition-enhancing policy (e #).
and this increases the labor demand in production. This shifts the curve of equation (22)
upward.
Second, stronger competition reduces the expected innovation value. In case 2, entry
cost e disappears under the free-entry condition of research firms since F (N) = e holds.
This implies that the decision of entry for research firms just depends on the expected
innovation value (which declines in M) and wage (which increases in M). As a result,
the policy shifts the curve of equation (21) downward.
Both shifts work to decrease R as in Panel (b) of Fig. 2. In sum, in case 2, the
competition-enhancing policy invites more imitators and the imitators crowd-out research
firms. In other words, the research firms’ incentive to enter becomes weaker than that of
imitators. This is in perfect contrast to case 1.
Threshold of Entry Cost
In this section, we attempt to determine the threshold of entry cost ~e that divides the
economy into two cases. We do so by solving N(e) = R2(e), where Rh(e) is the number
of research firms in the steady state in case h = 1; 2. Although we cannot analytically
derive ~e, we can easily show that it uniquely exists in (emin; 1).15 Note that the proxies of
15 N(e) is a strictly decreasing function in e and we have N ! 1 when e ! 0 and N = 0 holds when
e = 1. On the other hand, R2(e) is always a finite positive value e 2 (emin; 1) and a strictly increasing
function in this range. Therefore, the intersection of N(e) and R1(e) must be uniquely determined.
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∗(𝑒𝑒)
1
�𝑁𝑁(𝑒𝑒)
?̃?𝑒
𝑅𝑅1
∗(𝑒𝑒)
𝑒𝑒min
Case 2
𝑀𝑀 > 0 Case 1𝑀𝑀 = 0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
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← more competitive less competitive →
𝑒𝑒max
Figure 3: Comparative statics of e. Calculated numerically by setting L = 1;  = 1:2;  =
0:95;  = 0:01, and a = 0:01. Under these parameters, emin ' 0:31; ~e = 0:5, and emax = 2. All
parameter assumptions are satisfied.
PMC often used in empirical studies (e.g., average Lerner’s index, Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index) have a monotonic relationship with the entry cost in our model since the total
number of followers is strictly decreasing in e 2 (emin; emax). Therefore, we can state that
a decrease in e is a competition-enhancing policy in the model.
From the above discussion, we obtained the following result:
Proposition 1. There is a non-monotonic relationship between PMC and innovation.
When the level of PMC is low (~e < e < emax), the competition-enhancing policy (e #)
has a positive effect on innovation. On the other hand, when PMC is sufficiently intense
(emin < e < ~e), the competition-enhancing policy (e #) has a negative effect on innova-
tion.
Fig.3 summarizes the results.
Although the non-monotonic relationship between PMC and innovation is similar to
that discussed in earlier studies, the channels are starkly differ. Our model does not have
the escape competition effect in the model by Aghion et al. (2005) because we assume
that the number of firms is not fixed. In their model, even if the competition-enhancing
policy decreases the current profit, two neck-and-neck existing firms have no choice but
13
to increase their R&D efforts. However, in our model with free-entry, research firms are
allowed to exit (truly escape) from the market as in case 2. Furthermore, the decrease
in current profit distracts potential firms from entering the market. These effects are not
considered in Aghion et al. (2005).
Welfare Implication
Here, we investigate whether the growth-maximizing ~e also maximizes households’ wel-
fare. To do so, we calculate the welfare evaluated in the case where the economy starts at
the steady state.
In the steady state, we have lnCt = g  t + lnX from equation (2). By integrating
the lifetime-utility function (1) with respect to time, we obtain welfare:
W =
Z 1
0
exp( t) [g  t+ lnX] (25)
=
1


Ra ln

+ ln(L R)

:
By differentiating this with respect to R, we obtain
@W
@R
> 0, R < L  
a ln
: (26)
When this inequality holds, an increase in R also increases welfare. If L =(a ln)  0
holds, the inequality is violated since R  0, and then, a rising R decreases welfare.
From this result and Proposition 1, we have the following Proposition:
Proposition 2. The growth-maximizing ~e does not always maximize welfare and the wel-
fare implication depends on the value of L  =(a ln).
 When R(~e)  L   =(a ln), the welfare and the PMC level have an inverted-V
relationship, which is the same as that in Proposition 1.
 When L  =(a ln)  0, this relationship becomes V-shaped.
 When 0 < L  =(a ln) < R(~e), this relationship is ambiguous.
From equation (7), we can also write welfare as follows:
W =
1


Ra ln

+ lnN   ln(1 + N)  lnw

: (27)
The competition-enhancing policy affects welfare through the following three channels:
a decrease in e (i) always increases the number of followers N , (ii) always increases
14
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Figure 4: Welfare and entry cost under  = 0:01; 0:003; 0:0001. Parameters are L = 1;  =
1:5;  = 0:95, and a = 0:01. All assumptions are satisfied.
(decreases) innovation R in case 1 (case 2), and (iii) has a positive (ambiguous) effect
on wage rate w in case 1 (case 2). We cannot analytically derive the total effect in both
cases.16 However, using numerical examples, as in Fig. 4, we can show all patterns are as
written in the previous proposition by changing discount rate . The inequality in (26) is
satisfied if  is sufficiently small. This reflects that the first innovation-stimulating effect
becomes stronger when  is small because the households consider dynamic gains from
quality improvement more important than static distortion by imperfect competition. The
large total labor supply L also works to satisfy the inequality because the market price of
goods decreases because the wage rate in the labor market equilibrium decreases.
16In case 1, the third effect has a negative impact on welfare, whereas the first and second effect increases
welfare. In case 2, the first and second effects are conflicting.
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4.2 Patent Policy
Now, we explore the effect of strengthening patent protection on innovation. To do so, we
consider the repercussions of a government raising  in both cases.
First, we discuss the effects in case 2. Strengthening patent protection reduces the
number of followers N . Then, it shifts the curve of equation (21) in Panel (b) of Fig. 1
upward since e < 1, and this positively affects innovation. This shift reflects the Schum-
peterian effect: strong patent protection increases the post-innovation profit L and in-
novation value. Furthermore, because labor demand in the production sector decreases
and this puts downward pressure on equilibrium wage (R&D cost), the curve of equation
(22) in Panel (b) of Fig. 1 moves downward. This also has a positive effect on inno-
vation. Consequently, by the standard Schumpeterian effect and wage decreasing effect,
innovation increases in case 2.
Proposition 3. Strengthening patent protection ( ") spurs innovation (R ") when the
PMC level is sufficiently high (emin < e < ~e).
Note that the growth-maximizing level of PMC (~e) becomes lower under stronger patent
protection.17 This suggests that strengthening patent protection and competition-enhancing
policy may be complementary. Aghion et al. (2015) also showed the complementary re-
lationship by using a step-by-step innovation model without free-entry as in Aghion et al.
(2005). But we here show that in an EMS model, so it is also a contribution of the paper.
In case 1, the effect on innovation is complex. Strengthening patent protection has
a positive impact on innovation through the Schumpeterian effect and wage decreasing
effect as in case 2. However, in case 1, the policy also decreases current profit F and
this negatively affects innovation. 18 While the curve of equation (17) in Panel (a) of
Fig. 1 moves upward, the direction of the shift of equation (18) is ambiguous. However,
we can anticipate that the sign of the policy effect depends on the discounted rate. If
 is sufficiently small, the research firms may understate the decrease of current profit
F . We numerically examine the effect of strengthening patent protection on innovation.
Fig. 5 indicates that while stronger patent stimulates innovation when  is low, it discour-
ages innovation when  is high. However, when  is in between, there is an ambiguous
relationship.
We summarize the results as follows:
17To understand this, see Fig.3. Since strengthening patent protection reduces the number of followers
N , the curve of equation (20) shifts downward. From Proposition 3, we know that the graph of R2(e) in
Fig.3 moves upward.
18This effect disappears in case 2 because F = e holds and then, the decision of entry for research firms
depends on aV and w (equation (14)).
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Figure 5: Comparative statics of . Calculated numerically by setting L = 1;  = 1:5; e =
0:55, and a = 0:01. Under these parameters, we investigate the effect on innovation when  =
0:02; 0:005; 0:0001. In these parameter settings, Assumption 1 is satisfied and ~e < 0:55.
Numerical Result 1. Strengthening patent protection ( ") has any of negative, ambigu-
ous, or positive effect on innovation when the level of PMC is sufficiently low (~e < e <
emax).
Our result differs from the findings in Chu et al. (2016), that is, a stricter patent pro-
tection deteriorates growth in the long run. In case 2, our model shows that strengthening
patent protection enhances innovation through the Schumpeterian effect. It is widely
known that empirical findings on the effects of tightening IPR protection on innovation or
economic growth are mixed.19 To this effect, our ambiguous result is more consistent with
the findings of these studies. What are the causes of this variance? To answer this ques-
tion, let us consider the difference in entry between these models. In Chu et al. (2016),
an entrant becomes the monopolist in a differentiated intermediate goods industry with
her own patents. Strengthening patent protection attracts many entrants over time, and
then, expanding the number of firms gradually decreases market share per firm. Because
of this “dilution effect,” the incumbents’ cost-reducing R&D is discouraged in the long
run. By contrast, in our model, all entrants (imitators and research firms) are initially fol-
lowers who imitate the leader’s technology and strengthening patent protection decreases
their pre-innovation profit. In case 2, this policy reduces the number of imitators and ac-
cordingly, attracts many research firms. This implies that the results depend on whether
researchers are damaged by strong patent protection.
We find that strengthening patent protection always enhances innovations in case 2,
19For related studies and surveys, see Falvey et al. (2006), Rockett (2010), and Greenhalgh and Rogers
(2010).
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but discourages them in case 1. The results suggest a complementarity with a competition-
enhancing policy, which is consistent with the empirical finding in Aghion et al. (2015),
who also theoretically explain the complementarity in a model without free-entry. How-
ever, since their result depends on the escape competition effect, such complementarity
disappears once we consider free entry, as Etro (2007) discussed. A key contribution of
our model is that we are able to retain the complementarity even after incorporating EMS
in the model.
5 Conclusion
This study developed an analytically tractable innovation model to evaluate the effect of a
competition policy on innovation. To analyze the effect more realistically, we considered
free entry in the product market and a situation in which only existing firms engage in
R&D activities.
Our study makes three contributions to the literature. First, we reconciled the result
of Aghion et al. (2005) and EMS proposed by Etro (2007). We found that a competition-
enhancing policy has a non-monotonic effect on innovation, which is also in the model
comprising a fixed number of firms by Aghion et al. (2005). Nevertheless, while Etro
(2007) points out that non-monotonicity disappears once we consider a framework with
EMS, we succeeded in retaining it using a DGE model with EMS. Second, we showed that
the innovation-maximizing PMC level does not always maximize welfare and it depends
on parameters such as a discount rate. Interestingly, there is a case in which the welfare
function has two extreme values with respect to entry cost. Finally, we investigated the
effect of strengthening patent protection on innovation. The model demonstrates that
stronger patent protection does not necessarily enhance innovation because it decreases
pre-innovation profit and research firms exit the market. This effect does not exist in the
model without free entry.
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